The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - current issue

Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind

Gerrans, P., Stone, V. E. — 2008-05-24

Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis.

Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity

Developmental Components of ToM

The Analogy with Modularity of Language

Dissociations without Modules

The Evidence from Neuroscience

Conclusion

A Puzzle about Laws, Symmetries and Measurability

Roberts, J. T. — 2008-05-24

I describe a problem about the relations among symmetries, laws and measurable quantities. I explain why several ways of trying to solve it will not work, and I sketch a solution that might work. I discuss this problem in the context of Newtonian theories, but it also arises for many other physical theories. The problem is that there are two ways of defining the space-time symmetries of a physical theory: as its dynamical symmetries or as its empirical symmetries. The two definitions are not equivalent, yet they pick out the same extension. This coincidence cries out for explanation, and it is not clear what the explanation could be.

The Puzzle: Symmetries, Measurability and Invariance

1.1 The symmetries and the measurable quantities of Newtonian mechanics

1.2 The puzzle

Two Easy Answers

Another Unsuccessful Solution: Appeal to Geometrical Symmetries

Locating the Puzzle

The Relation between Laws and Measurability

A Possible Solution

Countering Kauffman with Connectionism: Two Views of Gene Regulation and the Fundamental Nature of Ontogeny

Sansom, R. — 2008-05-24

Understanding the operation and evolution of gene regulation networks is critical to understanding ontogeny and evolution. According to Stuart Kauffman's view, (1) each cell type cycles through its own repeated pattern of gene expression, (2) the order of ontogeny is dependent on these cycles being short, and (3) evolution is possible because these cycles mutate gradually. This view of gene regulation reflects Kauffman's view that ontogeny is fundamentally the process of cells repeating cycles of activity. I criticize Kauffman's view of gene regulation networks and offer the connectionist theory of gene regulation as an alternative. On this view, the generic order of gene regulation mechanisms is due to the qualitatively consistent way that one gene product influences the expression of another. This allows networks to be stable and evolve to regulate accurately, allowing cells to react appropriately to their microenvironments, due to design by natural selection.

Introduction

Kauffman's Model of Gene Regulation

Explaining the Order of Kauffman's K = 2 Networks

The Importance and Relevance of Kauffman's Explanations of the Order of Gene Regulation

Additional Orderly Facts of Transcription

The Order of Network Accuracy

The Accuracy of Connectionist Networks

The Evolvability of Gene Regulation Networks

Laws of Structure

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

Crupi, V., Festa, R., Mastropasqua, T. — 2008-05-24

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

Introduction

Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: Test Cases and Basic Principles

Reply to Crupi et al.'s 'Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence' ([2008])

Huber, F. — 2008-05-24

Can Classical Structures Explain Quantum Phenomena?

Bokulich, A. — 2008-05-24

In semiclassical mechanics one finds explanations of quantum phenomena that appeal to classical structures. These explanations are prima facie problematic insofar as the classical structures they appeal to do not exist. Here I defend the view that fictional structures can be genuinely explanatory by introducing a model-based account of scientific explanation. Applying this framework to the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, I argue that not only can the fictional classical trajectories explain certain aspects of this quantum phenomenon, but also that an explanation that does not make reference to these classical structures is, in a certain sense, deficient.

Introduction

The Case of Wavefunction Scarring

Model Explanations, or How Fictional Structures Can Explain

Putting Understanding Back into Explanation

Fertility and Scientific Realism

Segall, R. — 2008-05-24

It has been claimed that modern long-standing scientific theories are fertile, in the sense of having been progressively successfully modified to meet new experimental observations or theoretical developments in related areas, and that these modifications arise naturally from each preceding version of the theory. McMullin has advanced this form of fertility as a vindication of scientific realism, since if the theories did not approximate the real, the observation would be inexplicable. In response Nolan has denied the existence of fertility in this sense as an independent virtue. The present paper argues that the rebuttal is flawed.

Introduction

McMullin's P-fertility

Fertility Explained Away as Novel Prediction

Conclusion

Francesco Guala The Methodology of Experimental Economics

Ross, D. — 2008-05-24

Andreas Huttemann What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?

Schaffer, J. — 2008-05-24